With news that Secretary of State Blinken is traveling to Beijing in June, it seems that the US and/or China is/are looking to put relations on a less confrontational footing. For several years relations have grown ever more confrontational, and dialogue between the two governments sparse. It remains difficult to see how either side can climb down from recent charges – that China is out to quash rights and democracy, that the US is trying to hobble China’s growth, etc. There is no doubt that the two countries are locked in some sort of rivalry – but do they even share an idea of what the rivalry is over? A look at the respective states’ conceptual bases can put current contentions in a broader perspective. Perhaps that would allow for clearer dialogue between the two.
Both sides have their Realpolitik thinkers, and both sides’ stances include Realist national interests, hence the concern over the ancient “Thucydides Trap.” To the Realist, rivalry and contest are inevitable when a rising power and a current hegemon face each other. It’s a natural implication of human nature.
But these two countries also carry different world views. Do those ideologies or philosophies matter? Aren’t they in conflict, just like the two sides’ Realist interests? Are merely the current terms in which the Realist’s “natural” contest happens to be argued?
China is ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP assumes the authority of a “dictatorship of the Proletariat,” theoretically on behalf of that historically sanctioned ruling class under Marxist-Leninist ideology. That ideology calls for the Proletariat to overthrow a Capitalist class, itself a historically inevitable creation of development as viewed through Marxian analysis. In this analysis, the ascendancy of the Proletariat is a universal value and the Communist Party is its agent.
The United States conceived itself as a people identified by our holding of “self-evident” truths, that all persons are equally endowed with unalienable rights, and that governments serve to secure rights and take their legitimacy from consent of the governed. The rights to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness are, by this creed, natural and universal to all humans.
Universal claims about humanity that clash with each other could well lead to contest and conflict between nations committed to them. Do the ideological differences just reflect the same dynamic that the Realists expect?
For China, a “yes” answer may be plausible. There is a Chinese identity under the CCP’s tenets, based on characteristics received from thousands of years of tradition. Those traditions are born of hierarchical societies and philosophies that lead people to accept their social station for the sake of harmony and peace. These ethics complement the initial, primal, purpose of almost all societies, to support physical safety and well being for the population. Communism also prescribes an order that aims to serve material needs. Both the CCP’s tenets and Chinese tradition serve Realist ends.
In this orientation, China is in the same mindset as nations throughout all history until 1776, and most yet today. The bottom line is economic well being and security against foreign aggressors. And everyone pursues the same interests, which makes clashes inevitable.
Still, Communism has a goal that is expressed in principle – something like Marx’ own slogan: “from each according to his abilities, to all according to their needs.” If a dynastic emperor could pursue purely personal whims so long as he kept peace and order, the Communist ruler answers, at least in theory, to a public standard.
For Americans, a public standard was baked into our identity from the start. The Declaration says governments are created to secure unalienable rights, to all persons equally. That ethos overrides ethnic or traditional identities – the signers of the Declaration were severing ties to their ethnic motherland. Ethnically European men may have run the country for many decades, but the nation’s legitimate identity rests on principle. That founding ethos has driven fitful but persistent evolution in American government, because we all know implicitly that it defines us.
Yes, we must also show that free people can provide for material needs and security – creed needs a body in which to live, and our creed-conceived nation lives amid a world where the Realist state of nature still holds great sway. But our fundamental national purpose is shaped, and constrained, by our creedal principle.
Our principle is abstract, not tied, as with the Communist principle, to any particular analysis of the human condition. Our politicians are driven by diverse interpretations of human nature and its condition. Some interpretations may be compatible to some degree with some aspects of the CCP’s formal tenets, while some directly oppose the Marxian economic analysis under the CCP’s public standard. Our political process allows us to choose our viewpoint. Meanwhile the CCP offers no channel for the governed to express or withhold consent. Its outlook is set.
Thucydides’ analysis may have worked from Athens and Sparta, Britain and Germany, and many others. But for Americans, it is no law of nature and we have our own ethos to follow as we manage relations with China. While our current geopolitical, economic and cultural influence may fit the status of a hegemon, and China’s growth may fit that of a challenger, we are not consigned to any pre-determined Realist rule of human nature. Our purpose is based not on “natural” animal interests, but on natural rights and government for the governed.
Many Americans and Westerners believed that China after Deng Xiao Ping was evolving toward accommodation of the universal rights. And it is not beyond theoretical possibility that 1.3 billion Chinese might find ways to nudge their government to accept some obligation to meet individuals’ wishes. Their Confucian precepts do put obligations on the ruler, even as their Communism imposes a public standard. Could we base our relations with China on their choices to develop toward, or away, from us in their interpretations?
The idea of calibrating relations with China to their movement toward or away from our ethos has been mooted in at least one serious forum. Doing so would clarify to the world exactly what our core motive is. We leave no room for CCP hawks to insist that we are waging a second cold war just because they are a Thucydidian challenger. We refute claims that our policies primarily pursue power and wealth.
Such a mechanism also respects the Westfalian deference to existing sovereign power. We do not, as John Quincy Adams noted, go abroad seeking to destroy this monster. But we should condition any relations on its conduct. As Adams said in the same passage, “wherever the standard of freedom and Independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will (our) heart, … benedictions and … prayers be.” We can accept the practical protocols set in 1648; we can afford not to prescribe rules for China’s internal behavior. But we have every right to condition our relations by our core values, and we must.
Could this generic stance defuse Sino-American tensions? Probably not in itself. But amid the smorgasbord of interests in play, it offers a framework for us to measure our priorities. It gives clear signals to the Chinese government how their conduct could help them in their interests, or push us to raise protective measures, at home and with other nations.
Any interplay of signals and interests will not be neat. Any raising of protections or loosening of restrictions will take time and raise complications. But basing US policy clearly on America’s core tenets will set a context that should belie Chinese fears of our intent. It also clarifies when their actions affect truly vital national priorities. If they try to accommodate those needs, we may find more common ground. If they work further to undermine the ethos of rights, free peoples will know to gird for the contest.
Common Conviction 