Thailand is about to face, again, the question of democracy’s prospects, likely with major civil unrest in store. Wednesday will see Thailand’s parliament vote for the second time to select a Prime Minister. A rising young democrat with a near-majority of votes, riding a mandate from parliamentary elections in May, is likely to fall short a second time. What should America do?
Of course this is an internal Thai affair. Americans’ stakes have entirely to do with the nature and level of relations with Thailand and its regime. We do have ongoing security relationships, geopolitical and anti-drug related, legacies of past collaborations. There are also regional political interests, as Thailand is not in China’s orbit, and forms one of the larger nations in the ASEAN bloc. The question is: how should a nation founded on a creed of rights and government by consent of the governed relate to a military-based regime?
The reformist candidate, western-educated Pita Limjaroenrat, faces a classic case of authoritarian system-rigging. The current military-backed government won only 76 seats in the 500 seat lower house, but there is also a 250 seat Senate, appointed by the military, and a would-be PM must gain a majority of the total of 749 legislators to win. In last week’s vote Pita got 324 votes, versus 182 against, and 199 abstentions. Only 13 Senators voted for him.
This system was put in place in 2017, and led to current PM and ex-General Prayuth Chan-Ocha assuming power in 2019. In that election opposition groups also out-polled the military-backed party but were defeated in parliamentary voting. A difference from today is that the 2019 opposition was led by Thaksin Shinawatra’s populist party, which had elected him in earlier years, to an administration marked by charges of corruption and its own political malfeasance. The army, as has often happened in Thailand’s modern history, took the reins from the Thaksin clan and cemented its own hold – with a degree of support against the media tycoon and the messy populism he fomented.
What are the prospects for Thailand, and how do those weigh against our interests? For US policy-makers, there is a certain path of least resistance, treating the fact of elections as “good enough” to justify pursuit of our other interests. There is a rationale for this course: the nation, does hold elections, marking it as less authoritarian than neighbors such as Myanmar and Vietnam. The reformists may comprise an elite Liberal minority, plus, in Thailand’s case, the Thaksin-led populists. And the army at least claims to protect the monarchy, which seems to have some sway (arguably the reformists are boosted by disapproval of the current self-indulgent king). We also do not want to be “imposing our system” on any nation. China encourages – and benefits from – emerging nations’ bridling at western sanctimony.
Still, those nations are often run by authoritarian or clan-based regimes. Maintaining our current relationship with a Thai regime based on a rigged scheme would belie any profession of values that any US figure may put forward. If we don’t at least make a rigorous assessment of Thailand’s potential for future development, and weigh those possibilities deliberately against current interests, we play into Chinese claims that our true motive is to contain China, not to protect or nurture democracy.
What exactly happens in Thailand, and what precise value we attach to our tangible interests, will be known after the next vote in Thailand. No U.S. response is pre-ordained, and the outcome could be complicated – it is possible that Pita cuts a deal with the army, for instance. But we do need to recall that America’s core national interest is to validate the creed in which the nation conceived itself. The old interpretations – of Cold War and other doctrines – are eroding, and we need to connect our foreign relations ever more clearly to our founding tenets.
https://www.ft.com/content/eca2d8bc-ef1e-4ddd-aa26-38ebc311afec
Common Conviction 