The ultimate reason for US support of Ukraine is, this blog has argued previously, is to oppose, deter, and de-legitimate the naked use of war to pursue vested interests. Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and Putin’s in Ukraine are the only attempts to do so since 1945. Putin must not win this war, and it is crucial that he suffer some penalty for starting it.
The August 5-6 “Peace Conference” of a number of national security advisors, excluding Russia, may seem like idle talk, and may lead back to another standoff. It just might, though, suggest a path to penalizing Putin. Battlefield outcomes could well leave him some gains, and his diplomatic scorecard still features a number of nations that have not condemned his invasion. But Chinese, Indian, Brazilian and others’ attendance, with Saudi Arabia as host, all hearing Ukraine’s case, opens a door to getting the neutrals at least to acknowledge the invasion as over-the-line aggression. A general recognition of this fact would at least reaffirm the post-1945 taboo on force as an acceptable basis for a country to secure its claims against another.
The precise genesis of the Jeddah conference, somewhat hard to pin down in news reports, reflects deft diplomacy by a number of actors. China’s participation and willingness to continue, fits with its interest in raising its profile, including in ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Saudi Arabia’s interests in stature and relations abroad were bolstered. Western interests were served but not with a highly visible western hand. The image of a wide range of nations listening to Ukraine’s case should be nurtured; the setting allows the case against Russia’s aggression to become a matter of generally acknowledged fact, not just western or European interests.
The trick for U.S. diplomacy will be to keep this process focused tightly on Putin’s unprovoked initiation of war. What the post-1945 norm has almost erased is the long-standing idea that a sovereign might demand something solely because he (often a king) wanted it and would launch a war for it, with victory (or defeat) as justification for taking (or losing) that stake. Again, only Saddam Hussein and Putin have done this since 1945. Every other war involved some reasonably sincere or clear claim of right or justice.
We should clarify this point – every other conflict has been over some claim to justice rather than naked self interest. Even when Russia invaded portions of Ukraine in 2014, it wasn’t completely clear that populations in the Donbas were not sympathetic, or that the Crimea should be a part of Ukraine. Hence the weaker international response. The world may disapprove of Saudi Arabia’s conduct in the Yemen civil war, but their concern over stability on the peninsula is not the same as naked force for self interest. China and India have had military skirmishes on their border, not just a few years ago, but in 1962 – essentially over unclear border demarcation. And of course, we should note that our invasion of Iraq, while certainly subject to reasonable criticism, was part of long-running opposition to Saddam Hussein and his aggressive regime. In contrast, Russia’s reported response to the Jeddah conference comes in Dmitry Medvedev’s post that it did not acknowledge Russia’s claim to Ukrainian territory. The only justification for such a claim now would be that they hold it, i.e. that might makes right.
It is also important that we nudge the conference to focus on Ukraine and not on concepts of sovereignty and international law. Both of those ideas are too often invoked for nefarious purposes. In particular, of course, China cites them regularly – including in their own self-serving “peace proposal,” which they reportedly presented in Jeddah. “Sovereignty” forms the basis of their claims on Taiwan. But that country’s vibrant democracy carries a legitimacy in itself. Further, its current autonomy is the outcome of a civil war, not some theft of territory. Armed extinguishment of freedom on a questionable citation of “law” cannot gain any degree of approval or acquiescence while we sanction Putin’s naked aggression.
Last, we should focus on the issue of aggression, and avoid claims to support democracy. Ukraine is not a full democracy. Military aid on that premise corroborates the narrative that we spuriously cite democracy or human rights for the sake of power politics.
With these caveats in mind, it remains important for U.S. and western nations to keep a low profile as we nudge the process to focus on the question at hand. Asserting these points in as quiet and clinical a manner as possible is not only prudent but fair, and useful. The logical extension of recognition of Putin’s illegitimacy in these actions could lead to his further isolation in this war effort. But regardless of that prospect, if a wide international consensus affirms a norm against unilateral aggression, an essential principle for the nurturing and survival of free societies will be at least partially salvaged.
Common Conviction 