In the wake of the 22nd anniversary of 9/11, a reflection on all that has happened since sparks a speculation. Alternative history is not a rigorous exercise, so should never be used to apportion blame or ignite controversy. But if failing to study history condemns us to repeat it, could speculating on it help us make better history going forward?
Osama bin Laden launched 9/11 out of resentment that US troops were still on Saudi soil, years after Saddam Hussein was ejected from Kuwait in 1991. Following Operation Desert Storm, George H. W. Bush had decided not to follow up with an invasion of Iraq. This was reasonable and prudent: we had accomplished the goal of undoing the aggression; the broad coalition opposing Saddam had not necessarily agreed to regime change; and the killing could stop, notably without serious US casualties that an invasion might incur.
The stop did leave a few loose ends in place. While Bush called on Shiite Iraqis to overthrow Saddam, he did not support those who rose up. So Saddam stayed in power and the “marsh Arabs,” as we knew them then, felt betrayed by the US. The most egregious violation of the post-1945 norm of non-aggression lost soldiers and arms but not power, and America lost credibility. And US troops stayed in Saudi Arabia, which encompassed Islamic holy land.
Would bin Laden have even bothered with us if we had deposed Saddam and left the region? If not, we would not have had to go into Afghanistan to dismantle al Qaeda. Would Iraq have required the constant constraint of sanctions and no-fly zones, and lingered as a potential danger, without Saddam? If not, the drive to depose him would not have simmered in US policy and political impulses. These are speculations of course. But what if?
Would invading Iraq in 1991 have been justified? Again, calling a stop to the war was a move of prudence and peace. But an invasion, while the military situation seemed so favorable, might have inflicted real punishment for drastic aggression. Vladimir Putin may have been deterred from the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The norm created in 1945 – to which almost all exceptions involved ethnic and internal disputes, pre-existing territorial disputes, and other factors that mitigated the sense of outright aggression – would have been decisively enforced. The transition from a war of defense and liberation to invasion and regime change could fit with the theory of just war if an Iraq regime change did not turn into a conquest. Quick withdrawal of US troops, perhaps with an Arab League, UN, or other international transition regime, may have fit that bill. In short, again in speculation, an invasion might have been done in a just and justifiable manner.
What might this speculation tell us today? One thought may be to avoid mechanistic “don’t repeat the last war” lessons. Did we stay too long in Iraq and Afghanistan in any part to avoid leaving a mess behind? Did we go into Iraq in 2003 to finally impose the cost that we felt had been due in 1991? Lessons, like speculation, need to be taken for what they are: guesses.
Another thought might say to finish wars thoughtfully, especially in success. The end will lead to something afterward and we need that something not to raise more problems – more wars – later. Clarity in ending a war may be as important as clarity in entering one, politically, economically, and morally.
Finally, clarity should keep the underlying purpose for any war, or any international action, at the forefront of policy. In 1991 we opposed an egregious unilateral invasion and may have left the sin undeterred. In 2001 we dismantled an organization that attacked the United States but turned into occupiers of their host country. In 2003 we invaded a country on an unexamined assumption that national security demanded regime change in Iraq.
America’s core national interest will lead to various commitments and doctrines, but we should always refer back to our moral anchor. A nation founded on a creed of rights must protect itself as that creed’s living vessel; out must also fulfill our commitment to its principles. Stopping and deterring aggression fights instability that stifles freedom. Spanking an aggressor, but then pulling one’s punches out of prudent Realpolitik, may harm that interest.
Common Conviction 