In the past month Time magazine has reported, and Foreign Affairs has analyzed, a powerful and useful policy innovation: the disclosure of U.S. intelligence findings, notably but not only to debunk Russian disinformation.
This function is part of a clear strategy, managed by the intelligence principals (DNI Avril Haines, CIA Director William Burns, and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan), oriented by sensible guidelines, and, per the Time report, staffed by a tight team of professionals.
Washington being Washington, the function “Is set to become a durable feature of the foreign policy landscape”, likely under the title of “Intelligence Diplomacy.” Washington being Washington, what uses it will serve in the future, what authorities will manage it, and how, as a result, it will color U.S. foreign policy, are open questions today.
The Foreign Affairs analysis addresses the concern of politicization by “cherry picking” of intelligence for release. More generally, though, would “Intelligence Diplomacy” serve make our policy making more transparent, as DNI Haines has alluded? Would it be used to curry favor or punish rivals, protecting or revealing information as a weapon? Might disclosures be made to weaken a bargaining counterparty – and on what issues? Why and how might any particular action be taken? Could bureaucrats disclose other agencies’ initiatives to gain policymaking influence? Who would manage disclosure practices – against the risks of compromising intelligence operations, but also to ensure our credibility in international conduct?
Now, before staffs and budgets become institutional fixtures, before functional specialists become bureaucrats, someone needs to think these questions through. Thinkers could include current staffers, legislative workers familiar with intel and disclosure, current principals and their staffs, informed commentators and scholars, and others. We should seek apolitical, disinterested principles for this function, whether it’s a weapon or a window or both, and what disciplines should be permanent precepts, fixed in place regardless of administration.
Such open-ended thinking , for such a new function, invites arguments and positions that “talk past each other.” A consensus bottom line criterion is needed. , Proponents of any proposal must connect their case to that bottom line by short, clear conceptual rationales,. For America, that bedrock should be the nation’s founding ethos, of the creed named in the second sentence of the Declaration of Independence. Any function needs, ultimately, to serve our faith in unalienable rights. Intelligence serves rights through some choice, or mix, among: protection of our culture of rights from external belligerents; provision of reliable information about dangers and advantages we face; support for other functions such as military and economic policy; and the like. Operations in this function must also comport with our founding tenets.
Whatever core function and rationales are adopted, they also need to fit with other functions’ corresponding rationales. Diplomats, for instance, as carriers of the core national interest of the Declaration’s creed, may need a degree of control over intelligence disclosures. Military commanders may need discretion to share (or withhold) intelligence from foreign militaries.
Above all, a sensitive and powerful function like Intelligence Diplomacy needs clear purposes, disciplined usage, and reliable, professional, apolitical management. All relevant personnel should carry basic, underlying commitment, personally imbued as professional identity, to our founding premises. Commitment to that ethos will best insure that we use this tool to serve our fundamental ends.
Common Conviction 