President Biden has announced major tariff increases against China, headlined by a quadrupling of tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. He cited the actions as “strategic and targeted actions that are going to protect American workers and ensure fair competition.” But are these all the motives in play? And how do our motives fit America’s overall purposes?
The measures themselves follow a 2018 update to “Section 301” trade legislation, which counters a full range of Chinese practices, in the stated interest of U.S. workers and industries. The bill and the current tariff announcement cite unfair Chinese practices, but neither refers explicitly to liberal trade and economic principles, which underpin the concept of a rules-based order. We might have imposed the EV tariffs by designating American EV production as an early stage industry that needs a period of protected development to realize its natural comparative advantage. Had we invoked that nuance to liberal trade principles, we would affirm a commitment to rules-based economic relations. This would refute charges of protectionism, to which we generally object.
In these actions, and the intent behind Section 301 overall, are we muting the commitment to principles of free and open trade? Are we simply engaging in hard business bargaining, in a rules-based economic contest with China? Are we managing their overcapacity in a range of products, which may or may not have geopolitical motives? If our concerns are fundamentally economic, can the economic contest be isolated from geopolitical issues?
Or do our economic measures fit a wider strategy to outcompete China? If so, are we suspending our commitment to liberal economic principles to press the wider competition? If so, what role does a liberal international order have in our priorities?
China may well be pressing its own comprehensive strategy, to increase its clout geopolitically, economically, and culturally in a global competition. Their ends seem aimed at reducing U.S. influence for its own sake. If we ourselves see an across the board competition with China, is our aim simply to best China? If so, to what end? What ends do we pursue? What would victory look like?
If we do not answer these questions, we leave China free to paint us by their own brush, which is, as we know, that we only really care to maintain overall power and primacy, and cite rules and international orders hypocritically. Our goals could only be, in that case, to maintain geopolitical and economic might, for the sake of dominance and wealth. In a such a pure Realpolitik contest, they would see their own trade measures, subsidies, diplomatic and economic and military pressure, and geopolitical influence, as fair tools in an open fight.
But we do have bigger purposes. America cannot fail to advocate unalienable rights and government by consent of the governed, protect their requisite conditions where those exist – such as in US elections or Taiwanese autonomy – and nurture practices that enable freedom, such as principled economic policies. We must not only show evidence, as we have, of Chinese abuses of those tenets, but fit our means to the larger ends, and explain the connections.
EV tariffs might be couched to fit liberal trade principles, or, if unfair Chinese EV subsidies to lock up market share can be shown, to blunt China’s realpolitik. We need to decide which. We need to know, and say, what our rationale for tariffs or any other measures are. This will entail choosing our priorities in Sino-American relations. Tariffs to enforce free trade, or protectionism for uncompetitive industries and unsustainable jobs, only paint us as belligerent unless they lead to some goal that serves our bedrock interests. Our priorities must carry our commitment to our own bedrock founding tenets.
Common Conviction 