“A Theory of Victory For Ukraine”, a Foreign Affairs article by Andrey Zagorodnyuk and Eliot Cohen, offers a compelling answer to the unaddressed question of what we are aiming for in Ukraine. In short, victory for Ukraine. That will entail arms to sustain Ukraine’s military resistance, coupled with deep strikes on Russia and Western economic and informational pressure, and, in perhaps a year, military offensives at some level, all to raise pressure on Russia while it depletes its resources. The end game would be either that Putin comes to the table on Ukraine’s terms, or the Russians replace his regime in some manner.
This victory for Ukraine is crucial, for reasons that get little attention. Many cite strong support of Ukraine as a necessary deterrent against China invading Taiwan, and almost everyone sees that support as support for democracy or a rules-based world order. But the most cogent reason to defeat Putin is that Putin believes his interests can be seized by force and legitimized by armed success. The illegitimacy of arms as arbiter of interests has been a staple of all international relations since 1945. The one other major case where outright force was employed for otherwise unjustified self-interest was Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. His regime was destroyed as a result, however belatedly and however attenuated the process.
America’s stake in this rock bottom rule against might as right goes beyond “peace,” in whatever definition that might take. America founded itself on a creed of unalienable rights and government dedicated to securing them. A state of nature, domestically or internationally, fundamentally inhibits people’s ability to live by their chosen lights. Having excised the old-world norm of princes legitimizing their claims by war, the world must see any naked aggression defeated and its perpetrators punished. To us, this enforcement is crucial, specifically to preserve humanity’s progress out of the state of nature, for the sake of rights and the social conditions that protect and nurture their exercise.
So victory over Putin is crucial. Strong support for Ukraine is no punishment without it. However impractical an immediate offensive might appear today, a permanent defensive stance, as advocated in one rationale, will only leave Ukraine vulnerable, and show Putin and others that indeed, might can effectively make right.
Zagorodnyuk and Cohen allude, incidentally, to direct collaboration with Ukraine’s indigenous arms industry. At least one private American initiative aims to finance its growth, to assist in a Ukrainian victory. This effort not only improves Ukraine’s military sustainability directly; it also imposes economic, diplomatic and informational costs on Russia. On top of those laudable outcomes, the initiative exhibits private Americans rallying in America’s best strategic interest, which further validates our pursuit of our sovereign existential interest.
The narrative for victory in Ukraine, particularly if coupled with the clarification that it is Putin’s aggression, not Ukraine’s debatable democracy or any Western interest in a favorable “order,” that triggers America’s position, can serve a wider American strategic stance. Victory in Ukraine shows China our resolve over matters such as Taiwan’s autonomy. If we also specify that indeed, democracy is directly in play given Taiwan’s genuinely free society, we clarify the reason we oppose “state of nature” aggression. Yes, we acknowledge China’s claims of sovereignty, but they have also accepted non-violence in their relations with Taiwan. Our unqualified protection of Taiwan – so long as that democracy wants its autonomy – not only fits our rationale against aggression, but announces the underlying principle to that stance, of human liberty. Clarifying our motives in this case and Ukraine’s will belie China’s claims that we are simply out to curb geopolitical rivals. Our policies become clearly tied to principled, bedrock premises.
Of course this narrative will have to account for the Iraq invasion of 2003, and we would need to be able to explain other actions or stances in its terms. As to Iraq, first, we had no interests we pursued for our some political or material gain. There was genuine concern, however lacking the evidence, of an Iraqi WMD program, and our long running hostility to Saddam Hussein started with his own naked aggression in 1990. Another major point we will need to explain will be our position – whatever it becomes – regarding Israel and the Palestinian people. In that case, we should note the difficulty presented by the conflict’s zero-sum nature. Israel and a Palestinian state will exist on contested territory, no matter how it is divided. America has a natural sympathy for Israel, which is a true democracy in its internal workings, and however legalistic and contested its founding, a recognized nation in the world. But the matter is perplexing in its physical existence on contested land, and questions rise further in settler expansion in the West Bank. The point, whatever stance we carve out, is that our nature supports rights in principle and in this case no choices will serve everyone fairly. We can only seek the best answer based on clear principles.
Finally, are we already at war, for democracy or something like it? Maybe. Whatever the case, and whatever means we take to secure our ends, those ends must be clear to us. And clarity to the world will bring us the sympathy, in less time than some think, of people as opposed to regimes. Victory in Ukraine, for the reasons we cite, is necessary to fulfill this commitment. Lesser aims and efforts will obscure our principles, and risk debunking our founding principles.
Common Conviction 