The Biden Administration’s pursuit of a mutual defense treaty with Saudi Arabia, tied to Saudi “normalization” of ties to Israel, is a bad idea.
The idea does seem to offer multiple benefits: bolstering what one analyst notes as an “inside-out” track to Israel-Palestine peace, aligning the Middle East to contain Iran, and boxing China and Russia out of disruptive initiatives with Saudi Arabia, all in one fell swoop.
The cost, largely unremarked so far, is inconsistency in U.S. motives that an alliance with an authoritarian regime would exhibit. A few cited parallels with the U.S. – Japan defense treaty highlight the inconsistency. Japan is of course a firmly democratic state with entrenched rule of law and respect for rights. Saudi Arabia is, of course, an absolutist monarchy known for its murder abroad of dissident Jamal Khashoggi.
For all the support given to dictators during the Cold War, backing “our son of a bitch” against the Soviets’, this pact would be our first formal treaty, carrying the force of law, with so clearly authoritarian a regime. America’s fundamental narrative of national purpose in the world is as a font and protector of freedom. Through all the compromises to pursue the USSR’s direct and totalitarian strategic threat, through all our fumbling at so many times, and through the exigencies imposed by fears of terroristic attack, this step would mark an indisputable, deliberate departure from our historical intent.
Do the prospective benefits merit this cost? Regarding any settlement between Israel and whatever Palestinian entities, Israeli politics makes that benefit uncertain. And developments of Saudi-Israeli ties are unlikely to change Israel’s basic interest.
Regarding Iran, while fomenting cooperation against Iran’s influence is a good idea, America still has a benign, if not quietly positive, image among their general population. The latter has something to do with democracy, or at least discontent with the regime’s suppressions. A full blown treaty with Saudi Arabia would confirm that Iranian desires for freedom can’t look to us for support. We would forfeit our moral influence, and while this is often derided or relegated to “soft power” marginality, populations at large have more access to information and more power to frustrate regimes in this modern world. At the very least, hostile leadership in Iran could easily debunk our expressions supporting liberty for Iranians.
The same ceding of narrative would apply to any benefits regarding great power competition. Russia and China already look for ways to undermine American claims for a rules-based world. Now we would give those adversaries another large exhibit for their case. True, we would tighten ties with the Saudi kingdom and its various assets, and of course China would be happy to have their own ins with Riyadh. But this kind of tightening gives them a landmark to point to as they court other countries.
A treaty will also be difficult to sustain as America’s attention wanders over time. With another Khashoggi, the American public will again feel we should make the kingdom a pariah. And if we back away later from a formal treaty, our reliability as a partner, for anyone, comes further into question. We will lose competitive advantage to a China or Russia in our pragmatic dealings, our relations with truly free societies will be weakened, and our deep purpose in the world will be all the more muddied. This is a grand strategic cost, and we need to stop incurring these to pursue tactical goals.
We need to shore up our narrative of principle. Narrative, to be credible, needs to fit durable and sincere intention. Our only durable and sincere intentions will be closely connected to our purposes of freedom. A next step in our inconsistency is a bad idea today.
Common Conviction 