This week’s NATO summit in Washington has garnered more than the usual commentary. The continuing war in Ukraine has put the alliance in the geopolitical spotlight. At the same time, member countries’ electoral shifts – in France, the UK, and of course the coming US election, among others – puts it at a potential institutional crossroads.
An odd question goes largely unremarked: exactly what is NATO for? For Americans, how does it serve our sovereign interest?
An old saying laid out Europe’s Cold War goals for NATO. It was, as parsed in a recent op-ed, to “keep the Soviets out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” The Soviets were the ongoing threat to Europe’s security, Germany had been, and America stood as guarantor.
America’s goals for NATO were set in geopolitical terms. But our overarching aim was to contain Soviet Communism. The Soviets were dictatorial, expansionist, ideologically committed to our demise, and armed. Over time we came to see NATO, plus a range of other institutions, as serving a general virtue comprising democracy, capitalism, and a rules based international order. All those facets of this virtue stood in contrast to the USSR.
When the Soviet Union expired, so did Containment’s rationale, and NATO’s stated purpose for America. Europeans also came to question NATO’s purpose. Eastern European countries, emerging from Soviet dominance, sought protection from Russia, even in its non-Communist form, and many presented cases of democratic progress and economic modernity. Partnership seemed appropriate, but NATO seemed to persist mainly because it was there – and “brain dead” in some minds. As cited in an FT column, it is Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, solidifying the fear of Russia, that has given the alliance its new purpose. And we should note that it remains , at its core, a North American – European geopolitical organization.
Is America’s overarching goal the same as the eastern Europeans, or Europeans in general? A subtle “no” comes in the form of American calls for “Europe to be less reliant on the US and step up its defense spending,” as my friend H. Perry Boyle summarizes a New York Times commentary
And here’s the rub: as Perry says, “that won’t be nearly enough to protect the free world from the autocracies.” America’s interest is not simply in European security. This nation exists on the premise of unalienable individual rights, and government that serves to secure them. While much of Europe is governed under firm electoral systems, rule of law, and personal rights, it also comprises peoples identified by soil, blood, church and tongue – and ancient enmities. While Europe contains a concentration of the world’s freest societies, a European alliance not oriented against a Soviet Union could potentially serve as a Realpolitik bloc, simply a power player in the ancient power game.
Autocracy does happen to be a very bad thing for most European countries. But for America, free societies’ success is vital, to validate the premise of our very existence. Autocracy, even within another country, poses a challenge. We cannot stand by as freedom, or its vital conditions, are quashed. Not to put up a fight, literally if needed, compromises our deepest sovereign interest.
So, per Perry’s post: ”What should NATO do? Stop being NATO. Start being the FWA — Free World Alliance that includes all democracies. Isolate autocracies — throw them out of all international organizations — they can come back in when they want to play by democratic rules …”
An FWA would not correspond to NATO membership. It would include Australia, South Korea, Japan, and New Zealand. It might also exclude Turkey and Hungary, depending on their strong-mens’ success in stifling rights.
An FWA would continue, perhaps more effectively, in our stance against Russia. It would declare hard opposition to armed force deployed for the invader to seize something from the invaded, with no justification. Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait are the two naked attempts, since 1945, of a state attempting to use might as right, and freedom cannot hold up in a renewed state of nature . An FWA would also make a commitment to protect Taiwan: such a truly free, peaceful, and non-belligerent polity cannot be left to expire due to external force. True commitment to the idea of rights demands preclusive strength in defense of countries such as Japan or France or Sweden. And if deterrence fails, commitment demands a real fight, even if we lose wars, riches and people. Integrity in a vital principle includes willingness to incur true sacrifice.
We should note prior suggestions of alternatives to NATO. Atlantic editor Tom Nichols recalls his belief that NATO
should (have left) aside its roots as an anti-Soviet alliance and consider adopting the model of a collective-security organization, a group that reacts to aggression from anywhere and has no specific enemies … to dampen or prevent wars and genocides where it could, and aid other parties to do so where it couldn’t.
Nichols was “talked out of this optimism” by Putin. In another variation, the Economist notes the 2004 proposal for a 60-plus member “Alliance of Democracies” or a “Democracies 10.” But while 60 countries may elect governments, only 25 to 30 have firmly entrenched that habit, plus impartial rule of law and individual rights. A D-10 would exclude some of those. An FWA should defend those nations whose deep freedom gives them deep common cause, and the vital conditions for that freedom.
The nations that would fit this entente do enjoy a concentration of capacity for innovation and technology, which serve a defensive stance, including of vital institutional and social systems, especially well. Conversely, it comprises almost exclusively affluent societies, so risks looking like a rich countries’ club. So this group would need also to nurture conditions for freedom, encouraging societies emerging, however fitfully, into democratic rule of law such as Indonesia or Chile; protecting freedom of navigation and communication; and promoting economic growth. It needs to favor countries that maintain electoral systems, even flawed ones, over regimes that suppress, or only hold sham, elections. This alliance will have a strong kinetic defense, but its true power must reside in a moral appeal for any who would seek freedom. Evolution from our current configuration of alliances will take multiple steps and could occur through various paths. The principle is what matters.
Above all, a U.S. policy based on this concept will orient our alliances, and our foreign relations generally, to the nation’s founding creed and national identity. Our policy stances have yet to shed old legacies, but it is time to re-base ourselves on our own national fundamentals.
Common Conviction 