What might Americans make of the radical shift in Ukraine strategy signaled by Donald Trump, J.D. Vance, and Pete Hegseth?
One view sees discussions with Putin, over Zelensky’s and Europe’s heads, as betrayal of allies and victims and indifference to Ukraine’s rightful resistance and even democracy.
Another view says that Joe Biden’s strategy – to find a negotiated peace, had he been re-elected –would have been little different in outcome, likely leaving much conquered Ukrainian territory in Russian hands and excluding Ukraine from NATO. Meanwhile, in this view, America would spend billions and prolong the killing in a mock show of support, while still enabling European free-riding on security matters.
Almost no one focuses on a particular point – that Putin’s 2022 invasion was one of only two cases since 1945 of blatant unilateral initiation of armed force solely because the invader wants X from the invaded. In this case the desire is Ukraine’s extinction. The other case was Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. All other invasions were matters of pre-emptive defense, festering border disputes, disruptions of ethnic areas by disputed frontiers, or the like. Our (yes, erroneous) 2003 invasion of Iraq reflected a not-ridiculous belief that Saddam had been hiding nuclear weapons. Putin’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine met a muted response due to perceptions of Russian loyalty in the Donbas and arbitrariness in the allotment of Crimea to Ukraine. Prior to 1914, sovereigns – mostly hereditary persons – had a “right” to demand territory or other considerations from each other simply because they wanted it, and to take those if they could win a fight. The nations that did not get the message of World War 1 started World War 2 in that same spirit, and a new norm proscribing such use of power was instilled after 1945.
Saddam got his just deserts, albeit twelve years after his crime. Arguably the US should have gone into Baghdad, with the multinational coalition in hand, in 1991 – which would have precluded 2003.
Or – counter to this argument – was the US wise to stay out of Iraq in 1990, lest the still-extant USSR see invasion as a veiled threat against them? Did NATO expansion after the Soviet collapse pose the same threat to Russia? Did the ‘color revolutions’ in ex-Soviet Republics carry the same threat? The USSR was destroyed in no small part by non-military effects. Is that what Putin meant to pre-empt by invading Ukraine?
This fear may explain Putin’s motives. But just war theory draws a bright line at the use of armed invasion. Ukraine leveled no armed threat to justify Russia’s crossing that line. Strong Western diplomatic opposition, sanctions and diplomatic isolation signal our objections based on that ethos. Undoing Putin’s pariah treatment risks re-regularizing the pre-1914 barbarism.
That said, full enforcement of a non-aggression norm would be much more difficult against Putin than Saddam. Putin’s actual nuclear arsenal constrained Western resistance as it was. So that defeating him would have to occur through a narrow conventional military win. Sanctions only serve as signals of intent, which are ineffective if that intent is not explicit, more so yet if signal is not backed by force that could credibly turn intent into military defeat.
The Trump administration’s apparent rationale might call the West’s knowingly ineffective remonstrance against Putin hypocritical. And if the defeat of Saddam was not couched as punitive for his aggression – and “punishment” had even been withheld in our 1990 non-invasion – any sanctions on Putin are even less principled. A question arises, then: do we find Putin justified in his pre-emptive invasion given our failure to back a “just war” rationale? Or, on the other hand, do we see such notions as delusory, and simply treat this as Realpolitik, to be decided by might?
There is room for confusion as to Trump’s view, as he tries to pin moral responsibility on Zelensky, as a “dictator” who “started it.” If we feel Putin was mistreated, we need to be honest in our moral language: Putin started the war and we excuse it – while Zelensky’s postponement of elections in wartime is irrelevant. If we are playing Realpolitik, we don’t care about those matters at all. Trying to have it both ways only replaces what is deemed the West’s prior hypocrisy with Putin’s version.
Either way, what should be US policy overall, after a settlement? If the world is a Realpolitik place, what are our priorities? What is our deepest interest? Can a nation founded on a principle truly play Realpolitik? If we legitimated our own national existence in a commitment to rights, how pragmatic can we be in our choices of allies and our choices of objectives? Ukraine’s survival may not be a vital national interest, but what about the autonomy of a democratic Taiwan against Chinese force? What do we want to tell the world we will fight for, and how does that square with our legitimate national existence?
If, on the other hand, we believe Putin is justified in this war, can a cease fire settle his grievances, and include credible deterrents to any further invasions?
If the Western Liberal elites have overplayed their hand and justified claims of the AfDs of the world as well as Putin’s, if their trembling liberal order was beyond revival, then Trump’s unmasking of the hollowness is only a matter of candor. Reviving it will be a fool’s errand, and may have been anyway. Kicking over an eroding world order is one thing. Pace ex-National Security Advisor John Bolton, this administration has a coherent enough world view to do so. But constructing a coherent new US policy will require a number of choices, tracing back to our most fundamental interests and ratified by a consensus of Americans. That is another matter entirely.
Common Conviction 