Above and behind all the doings concerning Ukraine, tariffs, and other foreign policy matters, the question of U.S. – China rivalry looms in relative quiet, but still sets an overarching context to America’s foreign policy. As pointed out in “The Return of Total War” in Foreign Affairs, China poses a strategic challenge to the U.S. in arenas from Yemen to Taiwan. Challenges also arise in arenas ranging from competitive development of artificial intelligence to TikTok.
Do we see zero-sum warfare on every one of these matters as inevitable, or perhaps necessary? What is the nature, and the scope of the U.S. – China rivalry? Right now Americans still have investments and ongoing businesses in China, and while tariff ‘wars’ are arising, trade is deeply embedded in both economies. Yet there is also a feeling that our systems are in competition, on one hand for global influence – and on another hand for each to prove theirs comprehensively correct and the other’s wrong. Which is it – are we facing total war with China, where defeating them on every front is essential, or does “comprehensive conflict” mean any given interaction might be hostile but not necessarily all – or might we and China even collaborate on some matters? How do we decide?
Part of that decision may well have to do with China’s intentions. Understanding those will always be a fraught exercise. China operates, militarily and in other matters, in gray zones, where it is unclear if and where active strategic defense edges into aggression. Is ambiguity aimed to keep us unsure or to retain flexibility for them, or both at once? Clearly China under Xi Jinping stepped up an assertive tone in numerous channels, from “wolf warrior” diplomacy and “Belt and Road” investments to naval construction. But China still couches even its belligerent expressions as though in reaction to us. How do we assess overall strategic intentions? How deep does his control run? And what part of their intent, and/or their strategic nature, requires an assertive response from us?
In terms of overall socio-political systems the PRC is formally a Marxist-Leninist “dictatorship of the proletariat,” which exists in a nation of Confucian political traditions. The idea of individual political rights is an unqualified good for us, but not for them. To what extent does that commit them to undermine our system? Does it commit us to undermine theirs? How do we decide if, why, on what, and how to actively oppose them?
What are all the strategic “equities” in our government and society? Which of them are “national interests,” and how do we prioritize among them? This question, it should be noted, applies whether we believe in collaborating with China on certain matters, or we see unvaried hostility from them on all issues. In the latter case, the answers determine our strategy for victory, in the former they guide us in choosing our stances on different issues.
Chinese pronouncements cast us as selfish individualists, dominated by capitalist factions. They paint our concerns for human rights and political liberty as canards, whether strategic or self-delusionary, rhetorical cover for self-serving policies to gain wealth and power. If our relations are a matter of issue-by-issue negotiations, this view may suggest that their gray zone tactics are strategically defensive, that they simply want to exploit our perceived weakness, as costs and benefits come onto the table, issue by issue. Conversely, if we are in a bilateral existential contest between our two systems, this assumption tells us how they think they will prevail, and why they think they should.
Whatever our findings about China’s nature, intent, and potential for change, we can only start with our own intentions and priorities. Amid all our concerns, for physical security, property rights, fair treatment, and commercial advantage, which do we act on, and, crucially, by what standard do we set priorities and formulate our policies?
This blog casts the American nation as creature of our self-conception, in a creed of unalienable personal rights equally endowed in all, and of government that exists to secure them for the persons so endowed. Embracing the fact that different free persons will have different interests, aspirations, and real-life needs, that offers us our only cogent definition of national identity. In such an identity we must relegate internecine politics to the role of choosing among means, the better to effect and nurture common creedal ends. If we can be clear that politics will bring twists and turns in policy, but that the creed defines our underlying purpose, we have a common lens through which to view our policy choices.
If we determine that comprehensive conflict allows some arenas for neutrality amidst a wider but non-existential rivalry, we can apply this lens to monitor where we are too guarded or too lax. If we are in an all-fronts zero sum competitive conflict, then this lens allows us to prioritize (or feint or tactically de-emphasize) among our various interests. In the latter case, if we have fallen into Thucydides’ trap, we may care to recall that Germany was defeated in Clausewitzian war, and that the USSR collapsed under contradictions, per Marxist style analysis, between its professed socialist goals and its expansionist geopolitical traditions – and we won without a war. In rough analogy for China, we might follow a discipline adapted from Sun Tse – to first seize the moral high ground, pump up our own morale and undermine the adversary’s, and win without a shot. In fact, on our moral high ground of personal rights, we should be able to make all persons our friends, and secure our own system’s needs without a fight.
In a way, in this comprehensive conflict, we are lucky to have China as our adversary. We are compelled to clarify our essence to ourselves, and, in focus on that essence, gear our worldly doings – from building weapons systems to bolstering our creditworthiness – to cogent and durable strategies. We are pushed to take stock not only of our temporal wants, but of the sacrifices to be made and costs to be incurred to secure our deepest needs. And, in our founding creed of human liberty, we open an example for all humanity to use freedom well.
Common Conviction 