Two nuclear weapons have ever been exploded in anger. The revelation of these weapons’ awful power makes August 1945 an epochal historical watershed. For the first time ever, the literal annihilation of human civilization became imaginable. The end of days was no longer a religious abstraction but a prosaic, man-made, possibility.
The United States was the first builder, and the user, of these weapons. This nation itself is also a first real case of something that had been only an abstract image until its sudden appearance, this one in 1776. There had been no polity that defined itself on a principle rather than blood, soil, church, monarch, and/or tongue. There had been no significant society where rights were inherently endowed in common individuals – rights had largely been privileges bestowed by rulers, discrete carve-outs from their authority, mostly granted at their discretion. Power had been the currency of social order.
Now the nation conceived in rights had a weapon that made all prior powers look puny. We used it to end a war against totalitarian aggressors, to avoid an invasion of Japan that may have killed millions, and, we should note, without fully knowing whether and how the weapon would work. It did work, and in victory we built a new Liberal order. Would world politics be transformed?
Realpolitik did not end. To start with, the Soviet Union had nukes within four years. Apocalypse became all the more possible in the standoff between the antagonists, only deterred by the real (and Realpolitik) fear of Mutual Assured Destruction.
Today nine countries have these weapons. Most have used them in the diplomatic sense, to forestall any military action against them, and in some cases to inhibit responses to their political or military initiatives. Of course any and all will claim to brandish them only in self-defense. But the right to self-defense easily gets extended into claims for wider interests. In a world of Realpolitik, power is its own justification. And right has no power. All this while the deadliest weapons in history rest in many diversely-motivated hands, in a very Realpolitik environment.
The Cold War configuration of two major nuclear powers allowed a certain mitigation of the fear of nuclear annihilation. Only the two had to manage their relations to avoid detonations in anger. Both had a robust picture of the other’s interests and fears; each could at once deter attack by the other, and leave the other to govern by its own precepts. Outside of a few incidents, neither felt the desperate danger that might provoke nuclear response. Now, with multiple nuclear powers, relations are exponentially more complex. The odds grow immensely that misunderstandings, miscalculations, and rogue actors will lead someone, somewhere, to feel a need or desire to brandish its nukes.
How does a nation conceived in a principle of rights keep fidelity to its principled founding premise, while protecting itself in a world overshadowed by power and fear?
Many would wish nuclear weapons, or all war, away; a few might hope that “becoming a Switzerland” might gain us that immunity. Some call for the US to build an overwhelming arsenal, mirroring Britain’s imperial policy of keeping their navy as large as the next two nations’ combined. Either way, attempts to erase a strategic danger never work, particularly not for a nation as visible and wealthy as ours.
In the late 1990s, a number of statesmen called for multilateral negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. Even these distinguished figures, in their informed and thoughtful analyses, did not gain traction. With world norms in disarray in the 2020s, international movement toward any such goal is even harder to imagine.
Going forward, the US will need to effect some mix of unilateral deterrence, collaboration with compatible nations (whether in NATO, AUKUS, “five eyes” or new ententes), negotiated understandings (perhaps like the SALT agreements with the USSR?) with some others, and perhaps even conciliatory stances (unknown and TBD) toward a few, to best forestall nuclear blackmail – or destruction. Our founding creed can help in that our national interest carries a purpose other than Realpolitik – i.e. many nations have seen and will see good reason to align with us rather than fear us. Our founding is also a burden in that our commitment to freedom poses a threat to many regimes. Even if we do nothing but live well by our principles, no dictator can hold power without fear of their people. How we choose the mix of policies to best ensure our security will need to account for both.
The Japanese mark the anniversaries of the nuclear bombings, focusing on the need for peace. Many of them may consider themselves victims, though the US can reasonably see the detonations as an act of just war. Either way, we all still have to deal with the awe-ful (spelling intended) implications of those weapons. Perhaps we would best find a general mental, social – and thereby strategic – approach to the problem of nuclear weapons in collaboration with Japan – both free societies, one the user and one the target of the doomsday weapon. Perhaps we could start by joining Japan in national commemoration of the dates, neither as celebration nor self-flagellation, nor for performative intonations of the need for peace, but simply as a commemoration. This in itself would alert the public to the need for judicious policy regarding nuclear weapons.
Whether to work to eliminate nukes, to build bigger allied capacities, to establish enforceable ethics around their brandishment, etc. etc., we need a coherent approach. To address all the questions, America does have a clear bedrock sovereign interest to start from: We exist for the unalienable rights; we validate our founding premise by living well and keeping faith with our principle; and we understand that our interest requires protection and development of our capacity to live well in it. If we at least keep that core purpose clear and salient, we will show why no one truly needs to fear us, and it is what about us that no one should threaten. Form following function will set our objectives and standards to shape that mix of attitudes, ethics, policies, and international conduct, to best manage this existential concern for this nation of rights.
Common Conviction 