Common Conviction

With the Hamas attack on Israel, U.S. foreign policy now faces another formidably difficult issue, just as our House of Representatives cannot settle on a speaker, delaying aid to Ukraine and directly impeding policy regarding another war.  The combination of chaos, possible escalations, and our own weakness are beyond scary.  As one social media post put it, “This war in Israel could be the beginning of the end of the world …” 

It is time for American policy making to start from our deepest needs, and work back to current choices.  What do we want in the world, and how do these crises affect those fundamental goals?  If we have these answers, we know what we’re afraid for.  If we sketch those images first, we can see a clear underlying purpose rather than follow unstated, easily misunderstood assumptions.

To look at four major international issues: How do we support an ally, Israel, against a barbaric enemy in Hamas, yet safeguard innocent Gazans?  How long can we support Ukraine against a larger, nuclear-armed aggressor?  Can we protect democratic Taiwan against China, with whom we agree that Taiwan is not independent?  And how do we control our southern border while so many people are willing to cross jungles and oceans to get there?

Reacting to such problems as they arise, we get tangled in “yes-but” policies that might not serve either the “yes” or the “but.”  Yes, Israel, you must protect yourself, but don’t kill civilians.  No, we don’t want illegal migrants flooding in, but can’t make them stop coming.  Yes we stand with Taiwan but don’t we have other interests with China?  Yes we support Ukraine but don’t want to fill a bottomless pit.  Is our pious acknowledgement of “both sides” just us trying to have everything both ways?  Are we ducking decisions?

As Gen. David Petraeus says, we need first to get the “big things” right.   So we have to know our overarching purpose.  In the past, U.S. foreign policy had doctrines such as Containment, where all issues were assessed for how they helped counter the USSR.  Before that, we had a long-running habit of isolationism, fending off entanglement with other great powers and their interests.  Today no such doctrines exist, at least none that enjoy the consensus that supported those.  

What we do have, though we pay it too little heed, is a core identity. We are a People identified by our holding of certain truths – that all persons are equally endowed with rights and that governments exist to secure those rights.  Isolationism was meant to let us develop in that odd identity without impingement from geopolitics; Containment protected it from a dangerous foe.  Pending some new counterpart to those doctrines, we can only protect the places – starting at home – where our creedal ethos holds sway, to nurture it where people seek to develop in its norms, to encourage those who aspire to live by its ethos, and to exemplify it in our own conduct.

What does that mean for the particular issues?  The questions demand deliberation, but the creed sets the general direction.  In the Middle East, we want Israel to be secure in its democratic existence, and we want its neighbors to live in dignity, with the well being that could enable them to live, hopefully, in their own democracy.  In Ukraine, we need a blatant aggressor to incur some penalty for his aggression, and a settlement that allows Russians and Ukrainians alike to grow in freedom.  In China, we want Taiwanese security to live in its vibrant free society, and China to evolve, in its own path, toward freedom.  And on our border, we really want Hondurans, Venezuelans, and others to have decent prospects at home.

How do these scenarios guide us now, so that we improve on current practice?  What policies are actually feasible today?  We can only make our best guess – but as we deliberate how to enable them, we at least state our motives clearly.  The world, and we, will know what we are trying to do, and we will have a sense of purpose to shape our efforts, our next efforts if those founder, and our next steps as they might succeed.

On the border, what about an extension of NAFTA?  The bulk of would-be entrants are not Mexican.  Mexico is still not rich, and suffers from corruption and crime, but apparently most Mexicans live well enough to stay home.  Could life become “good enough” in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Venezuela, and other Latin American societies?  They might need only to become prosperous enough for rule of law to take hold, and the gangs to lose power.  

In the Middle East, could Israel get Palestinians to reject terrorist politicians in exchange for some form of economic and institutional “nation building?”  Could the Israelis secure collaboration and resources from their prospective partners under the “Abraham Accords?” 

In Ukraine, is it possible to sketch an image of victory over aggression? If not, can we make clear that our goal is to defeat and punish it, not Russian regime change or NATO expansion?  Would that not help us, and the world, know why we arm Ukraine now?  

Last, regarding Taiwan and the PRC, can we specify that it is Taiwan’s democratic, lawful, free society that we support, that semi-conductor supply chains or geopolitical positioning may be side benefits but not our goal?  Could this shape our support and our alliances to debunk Chinese claims – and allay any actual fears – that we are “containing” them out of hegemonic ambition?  

These are all questions and guesses, and in real life will all require deliberation.  The point is to deliberate under the umbrella of our overarching core interest, of rights and government for the people.  If we start with “the big things” we may avoid contradicting ourselves in the weeds.  Our founding creed is the biggest thing, and should be our starting point.