That Xi Jinping supports Putin in Ukraine does not surprise most Americans. But just because they’re both dictators does not dictate that he automatically would. Dictators are not natural allies against us; they each have their own regimes to uphold, which may or may not give them common interests. Russia is no longer a Communist regime, and shared ideology did not make Mao’s China a Soviet ally. Both have an interest in weakening America and the West. But as we address China, Americans should assess, and not just assume, Xi’s possible motives.
American strategist John Boyd distilled a discipline from Sun Tse: “… hold the moral high ground … tighten our alliances, pump up our resolve, drain away our adversary’s resolve, and attract the uncommitted.”
Xi apparently feels China occupying a moral high ground – in terms both of morale and morality – in the form of China’s social model. In terms of morale, Leon Aron notes in the WSJ how Xi has said that “capitalism is bound to die out and socialism is bound to triumph,” as “the irreversible general trend of social and historical development.” He may well see evidence in China’s generation of “economic success that it took the West centuries to reach.” In terms of morality, Xi is a Marxist. He seems puritanical in his commitment, zealously cracking down on heretical sins, especially corruption. As Aron cites, the CCP considers itself to be on the “right side of history and the side of human progress.”
From this perceived high ground, Xi is building alliances, maneuvering to build his resolve and weaken ours, and trying to entice the uncommitted. In geopolitics China is building partnerships and military capacities, while the West is showing its limits. Economically, among non-allied countries, the Economist notes China’s competitive strength making and selling cheaper alternatives to Western appliances and cellphones. The Belt and Road Initiative and the spread of Confucius Institutes, despite signs of poor execution, are efforts to attract others. Xi’s actions align with Boyd’s formula. Even his weakness, repression, he addresses from his sense of high ground, as defense of the party. His first major move in power was to purge Bo Xilai, a rival Communist, uncovering and prosecuting Bo’s corrupt patronage networks. Corrupt ministers get fired. They sin against state ideology, and that makes them criminals – along with other dissidents. To Xi, repression is law enforcement, the law being the party’s.
Such long term strategic concertation, according to Sun Tse, should lead to victory without a shot being fired. Or, in Xi’s words, the world “cannot be just dominated by capitalism and the West, and the time will come for a change.”
All of China’s moves are well known, and Boyd’s formulation is no secret. Xi’s strategic ensemble, whether or not it’s his actual policy and however facile this description may be, represents a reasonable analysis. What we don’t know is how we will respond.
America has means to counter every particular Chinese practice and policy. The question is how we would fit them all together. We are bolstering alliances against China and pledging to protect Taiwan. We are also pushing NATO to support Ukraine. These arrangements are largely with democracies, but China also sees our other alignments, with Vietnam and Saudi Arabia and, until a recent coup threw us out, a corrupt regime in Niger. They cite the contradictions to claim that our real aim is for power, not to support democracy, oppose aggression, or defend ourselves. Economically, we smother Chinese firms, variously citing intellectual property protection, national security risks, and price-distorting subsidies. China again notes our contradictions, including our own subsidies and ever-increasing sanctions, to dismiss our case for fair market practice. We warn of threats to democracy, but have a weakening consensus about our own electoral system. We decry human rights abuses in countries we don’t like, but forget the Jamal Khashoggis of the world when their murderers support our goals.
With inconsistent observance of principle in our policies, offering no explanations for the deviations, we cede the narrative to China. They cite the inconsistencies to tout their “axis of resistance” to us. And we confuse ourselves about our priorities in the world.
What is our purpose? What is our high ground? We have a range of rationales for opposing China, and many are powerful. But we need a consensus on which represent our fundamental purpose. If we just say “Liberal democracy and capitalism,” we ignore our shortfalls. At least one American points out the moral benefits of market economies, but someone else will always call for self-serving tariffs, or for sanctions on a democracy for narrow economic interest. By what principle can we concert our policies, the pragmatically ugly as well as the virtuous? For what priorities will we accept risk and costs, or forego some want? We can only answer from a clear consensus of American identity and purpose. We do have a starting point in our founding creed, of rights and government bound to secure them. Mobilizing a consensus around that bedrock, and then articulation of policy rationales, will take deep consideration and thoughtful policy. But our founding makes us a friend to real people, if we manage not to alienate them as we deal with ruling regimes. Our first step is to recognize and embrace, together, that common essence of our own nation.
Common Conviction 