John Quincy Adams is famous for his warning against going abroad “in search of monsters to destroy.” Today, whatever the vagaries of Xi Jinping and Donald Trump’s summit, it’s fair to say that U.S. foreign policy is not looking to go to China to destroy it.
For one thing, it wouldn’t make sense in practical terms. And part of Adams’ point was practical; at the time he faced a popular sentiment to punish the Ottoman Empire for reported atrocities against Greek rebels. The U.S. had little capacity to do anything like that. Beyond the practical realm, any campaign to upend the Communist regime in China also carries some risk of acting in unprincipled fashion. Of course, mainland China unabashedly suppresses political opposition, abuses human rights to that end as well as out of authoritarian non-accountability, threatens neighbors including democratic nations, and bullies, spies, and infiltrates globally. But many Chinese accept CCP authority or even support it, many have said (might still?) that China is freer than ever in its history, and of course the regime has raised China’s economic well-being, as well as national power, to unprecedented highs. The PRC isn’t unlike lots of countries that repress political dissidents, and most show economic performance – and growth in citizens’ prosperity – nowhere near China’s accomplishments. Only a handful of nations are democracies. Americans don’t need to be religious pacifists, political leftists, amoral Realists, or even run of the mill hedgers, to forego the impulse to destroy China’s Communist regime.
The primary risk of overt conflict, of course, has to do with Taiwan. Since 1971 all actors have followed the “one China” line. The fact that “both Chinas” feel they should rule the whole country allows the US and the PRC to “compromise,” both opposing a Taiwanese declaration of independence. And to date the Taiwanese have refrained, out of prudence for the most part.
But, as the PRC rises in its power, the question of defending Taiwan becomes more problematic for the U.S. Why should we defend Taiwan in its de facto autonomy? US policy does not say, even to ourselves, exactly why. Is it out of historical ties to Chiang Kai Shek’s government? Is it because we have economic interests in Taiwan, most prominently today the manufacturing facilities of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp,? Is it for the island’s geographical barrier to PRC naval power projection? Is it as a Realpolitik asset against a rising rival?
How about – for its democracy? Since the transition away from Chiang Kai Shek and his son, Taiwan has not only excelled in its economic performance, but maintained a well run and vibrant electoral democracy.
John Quincy Adams’ famous quote was of a piece with a much-less noted preface: “Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will (America’s) heart, her benedictions, and her prayers be.” We were too weak to do more than cheer for the Greeks when he made the speech, and in fact, as we have learned, unfurlings of freedom’s standard have often been less than pure. But in Taiwan, a political liberty as advanced as anywhere in the world is in place, among a population who live largely by the rights on which we conceived ourselves as a People.
Adams did call us champions and vindicators only of our own liberty. This comported with our norm of the day, isolationism, avoiding entanglement in others’ “wars of interest and intrigue … which … usurp the standard of freedom.” Since then, we have successfully protected and vindicated the liberty and independence of Europe from Soviet expansionism, including in countries that were deeply flawed democracies or worse. In Taiwan, we are today in a position to help protect freedom where its standard has in fact been unfurled. If properly oriented, this stance would be less pro-active than what we did in the Cold War.
Proper orientation would focus our commitment to the defense of Taiwan’s democracy. All other interests would need to be incidental to this, or less. Our best interest comes from our very founding premise, our holding of the truth of rights to be self evident, and applicable to all people. And in this age of global communications, our fidelity and sincerity in our creed is an existential interest. Forsaking a democracy for other interests, even in opposition to a dictatorship, would risk belying our own sovereign purpose. Put another way, if we abridge our holding of our own founding premises, are we in fact that nation created in the Declaration?
In the practical realm, this stance need not equate to armed belligerence toward the PRC. The US and China have managed the Taiwan question for fifty years. And American policy can voice a hope for developments, perhaps a special status for Taiwan or some evolution of PRC-Taiwanese bodies to co-ordinate the relationship between the mainland and the “autonomous province.” Such moves would fit under the current “One China” formula, and even facilitate better US-OCR management of the paradox of rivalry and co-dependence. And, if “history” stays under control, our belief in human free will just might find expression, in growth of some form of freedom in China. In any case, the circumstances behind John Quincy Adams’ isolationism have evolved, and America must keep faith with our founding premises.
As we mark Memorial Day, this reflection might shed light on the question of wars we must avoid, the ones we must risk, and the reason for either stance. We have a moral bedrock on which we must frame such questions, which we will commemorate in about six weeks.
Common Conviction 